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EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
ANDRADE V. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA 
270 F.3D 743 (9TH eIR. 2001) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A large majority of states have enacted recidivist statutes 
reqUIrmg increased punishment for repeat offenders. 1 
California's controversial recidivist statute, the Three Strikes 
and You're Out Law2 (the Three Strikes Law), was approved by 
ballot initiative and enacted by the state legislature in 1994.3 
Defendants have challenged the constitutionality of sentences 
under habitual offender statutes for at least twenty years.4 In 
Harmelin v. Helm,5 the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the constitutionality of a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole for a first time drug offender convicted of 
possession of 650 grams of cocaine.6 Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence in Harmelin set forth a three-part gross 
proportionality analysis to be applied to sentences imposed 
1 Andrade v. Attorney General, 270 F.3d 743, 762 - 63 (9th Cir. 2001). At least forty 
states have laws imposing harsher sentences on repeat offenders than first-time 
offenders. See id., (citing People v. Riggs, No. E019488, 1997 WL 1168650, at *4 n. 2 
(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1997). 
2 The statute is officially known as the Career Criminal Punishment Act. CAL. 
PENAL CODE §§ 667, 
1170.12 (West 2002). 
3 Career Criminal Punishment Act, Stats. 1994, ch.12, § 1, adding CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 667(b) - (i) and Proposition 184, § 1 as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 
1994), adding CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12; Andrade, 270 F.3d at 747. 
4 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 754. See generally Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Harmelin v. Michigan 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
6 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
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upon non-violent recidivists challenged under the Eighth 
Amendment's clause prohibiting cruel and unusual 
punishment.7 In Andrade u. Attorney General,s the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Justice 
Kennedy's Harmelin analysis to a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole for fifty years, imposed under the Three 
Strikes Law on a non-violent recidivist who stole nme 
videotapes worth under $200 on two separate occasions.9 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE CASE 
Appellant Leandro Andrade's criminal history, prior to his 
convictions appealed from in this case, included a series of 
convictions for non-violent crimes, totaling five felonies and two 
misdemeanors,lO beginning in 1982 with a conviction for 
misdemeanor theft.l1 One year later, Andrade was convicted 
for three counts of first degree residential burglary,12 a serious 
or violent felony under the Three Strikes Law. In 1988 and 
1990, Andrade was convicted in federal court on two separate 
felony charges for transportation of marijuana.13 In 1990, prior 
to the marijuana conviction, Andrade was convicted for petty 
theft.14 In 1991, Andrade received a parole violation for 
escaping from federal prison.15 
7 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 756. Justice Kennedy's analysis requires examination of: 
"(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences 
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for 
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id.; Solem, 463 U.S. at 
292. 
8 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001). 
9 Id. at 746, 749. 
10 Id. at 749. 
11 Id. at 748. While the State excluded this conviction from it's summary of 
Andrade's criminal history, the conviction was in the preliminary report relied on by 
the sentencing court during the sentencing phase of Andrade's trial. Id. at 748 n. 3. 
12 Id. at 749. 
13 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 748 - 49. 
14 Id. at 749. Petty theft is classified as a misdemeanor under the California Penal 
Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West 2002). 
15 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749. Under the California Penal Code, escape from prison 
is punishable by up to six years in prison. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4530, 4532. Escape 
from federal prison where the underlying confinement is for a felony conviction is 
punishable by a maximum of five years in prison plus a fine. 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (2002). 
2
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In 1996, Andrade was sentenced to life in prison, with the 
possibility of parole after serving a minimum of 50 years, for 
shoplifting nine videotapes worth a total of $153.54 from two 
different K-mart stores on two different occasions.16 The first 
incident, on November 4, 1995, involved Andrade stuffing five 
videotapes, worth $84.70, into his pants.17 Two weeks later, 
Andrade shoplifted four videotapes valued at $68.84.18 
Generally, such offenses are treated as petty theft, a 
misdemeanor, which carries a maximum penalty of six months 
in county jail and a $1,000 fine. 19 However, based on 
Andrade's status as a non-violent recidivist, the prosecutor 
chose20 to charge Andrade's petty thefts with priors21 as 
felonies triggering California's Three Strikes Law. 22 The 
elevated misdemeanors constituted Andrade's third and fourth 
strikes,23 while his 1983 burglary convictions served as his first 
and second strikes.24 
In a bifurcated trial, the jury convicted Andrade on both 
counts of petty theft with a prior.25 In the second phase of the 
trial, the court sentenced Andrade to two consecutive terms of 
twenty-five years to life.26 Andrade appealed his sentence to 
the California Court of Appeal. 27 The California Court of 
Appeal affirmed, rejecting Andrade's Eighth Amendment 
argument.28 The California Supreme Court denied review.29 
16 [d. at 746, 749. 
17 [d. at 749. 
18 [d. 
19 [d. at 748. ·Petty theft is punishable by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars 
($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or both." 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West 2002). 
20 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 748. The decision to charge petty theft with a prior or as a 
misdemeanor rests in the discretion of the prosecutor. People v. Superior Court 
(Alvarez) 14 Ca1.4th 968, 976 (1997). The trial court has reviewable discretion to reduce 
the wobbler offense to a misdemeanor at sentencing. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749. The 
trial court's discretion to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor at sentencing was not 
eliminated by the Three Strikes Law. [d.; Alvarez, 14 Ca1.4th at 979. 
21 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749. CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 authorized elevation of 
Andrade's current convictions to petty theft with a prior, a ·wobbler" offense, because of 
Andrade's 1990 misdemeanor theft conviction. [d. 




26 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749. 
27 [d. at 750. 
28 [d. The court rejected Andrade's argument that his sentence constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment. [d. 
3
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Subsequently, Andrade filed a habeas corpus petition in 
federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.30 The 
district court denied Andrade's petition on February 19, 1999.31 
Twenty-five days later, Andrade placed a Motion for Order 
Extending Time for Appeal in the prison mail system seeking a 
sixty-day extension to file his notice of appeal. 32 The district 
court denied Andrade's motion.33 Fifty days after the entry of 
the district court judgment, Andrade placed a Notice of Appeal 
in the prison mail system.34 The district court denied Andrade 
a certificate of appealability.35 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Andrade a certificate of 
appealability as to his Eight Amendment claim.36 
B. BACKGROUND: CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAW 
In 1994, the legislature and the voting public enacted 
California's "Three Strikes and You're Out Law" ("the Three 
Strikes Law").37 The law's purpose is to impose harsher 
sentences on repeat offenders with prior qualifying felony 
convictions or "strikes."38 "Serious" or "violent" felony 
convictions qualify as prior strikes,39 whereas the "triggering" 
felony conviction, or the principal offense, need not be violent.40 
Punishment increases with the number of strikes.41 A second 
29 Id. The California Supreme Court denied Andrade's petition without comment. 
Id. Andrade raised several constitutional claims, including a violation of his Eighth 
Amendment rights, which had previously been rejected by the California Court of 
Appeal. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750. 
30 Id. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) permits persons "in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States" to fIle a writ of habeas corpus. 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2002). 
31 The district court's order consisted of only two sentences and simply adopted the 





36 Id. Andrade initially fIled his appeal pro se, but the Ninth circuit appointed him 
counsel and ordered supplemental briefing. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750. 
37 Id.; Career Criminal Punishment Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b) - (i), 1170.12 
(West 2002). 
38 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 747. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. "Wobbler" offenses, those capable of being charged as either felonies or 
misdemeanors constitute a felony for the purposes of the Three Strikes Law when 
charged and sentenced as a felony. Id. 
41 Id. 
4
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strike requires the sentencing court to double the sentence the 
defendant would have received and a third strike mandates a 
minimum sentence of 25 years to life.42 
III. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
A. JURISDICTION 
The first issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit was whether 
the court had jurisdiction over Andrade's appea1.43 A timely 
notice of appeal warrants jurisdiction.44 A notice of appeal 
must be filed within thirty days after entry of the district court 
judgment. 45 The district court may grant a time extension if 
the moving party files the notice within the thirty day time 
limit and shows excusable neglect or good cause.46 Essentially, 
the Ninth circuit distinguished, re-examined and overruled 
precedent which held that a motion for extension of time may 
not serve as a notice of appea1.47 Although Andrade filed his 
notice of appeal fifty days after entry of the district court 
judgment, the court found that Andrade's motion for order 
extending time to appeal, filed within thirty days of entry of 
the district court judgment, served as "the functional 
equivalent" of a notice of appea1.48 Accordingly, the court 
concluded that Andrade's appeal fell within their jurisdiction.49 
B. DE NOVO REVIEW 
In reviewing de novo the district court's decision to deny 
Andrade's petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254, 
the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the state court's decision 
was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established federal law. 50 The Ninth Circuit is required 
42 [d. 
43 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 750. 
44 Fed. R. App. P. 3(a). 
45 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(a). 
46 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(a). 
47 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 751 . 52. 
48 [d. at 751. 
49 [d. 
50 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 753 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) and Van Tran u. Lindsey 
212 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000).). Based on the date Andrade fIled his petition, the 
court reviewed his petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 
5
Ross: Eighth Amendment
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
100 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 32:1 
to make a de novo determination of what is clearly established 
federal law.51 The court explained that under the 
'unreasonable application' standard, the court must also 
determine whether the state court erred, and if so, whether any 
error by the state court involved an unreasonable application of 
clearly established law.52 The court reviewed and applied 
controlling Eighth Amendment authority and held that 
Andrade's sentence was grossly disproportionate to his 
offense. 53 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
California Court of Appeal decision, which reached the opposite 
result, was an unreasonable application of clearly established 
of law.54 The court reversed the district court judgment and 
remanded with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus 
if the district court did not re-sentence Andrade within sixty 
days.55 
C. EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
The Eighth Amendment protects persons from cruel and 
unusual punishment. 56 Numerous United States Supreme 
Court cases decided over the last two decades address the 
constitutionality of life sentences imposed on non-violent 
recidivists. The Ninth Circuit, in Andrade, followed the lead of 
other circuits and applied the Harmelin u. Michigan57 gross 
proportionality test58 announced in Justice Kennedy's plurality 
opinion. 59 
Pub. L. No. 104 -132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr. 24, 1996), which requires application of the 
'contrary to, or unreasonable application' standard. Id. 
5l Id. at 753 (citing LaJoie u. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 668 (9th Cir. 2000». 
52 Id. at 753 (citing Van Tran u. Lindsey 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000». 
53 Id. at 767. 
MId. 
55 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 767. 
66 Id. at 753 - 54. The Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that there "shall not be ... cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. 
CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment "applies against the States by virtue of 
the Fourteenth Amendment." Andrade, 270 F.3d at 754 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 
962.). 
57 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
58 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 754. Justice Kennedy concluded that Eighth Amendment 
analysis requires gross proportionality, rather than strict proportionality, between the 
sentence and the crime. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting 
Solem, 463 U.S. at 288). 
59 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 753 - 754. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the opinion 
written by Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and three other justices, constituted 
6
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1. Review of United States Supreme Court Law 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the previous United States 
Supreme Court decisions in Rummel v. Estelle60 and Solem v. 
Helm61 to give meaning to Harmelin ~ gross proportionality 
test.62 In Rummel, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of life 
in prison with the possibility of parole for a three-time non-
violent recidivist convicted under Texas' habitual offender 
statute.63 Rummel's prior felony convictions included credit 
card fraud to obtain goods or services totaling approximately 
$80 and check forgery in the amount of $28.36.64 Rummel's 
third triggering offense was a conviction for obtaining $120.75 
by false pretenses. 65 In Solem, the Supreme Court reversed a 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a 
seven-time non-violent recidivist.66 The defendant's criminal 
history consisted of three third degree burglary convictions, one 
conviction for obtaining money under false pretenses, one 
grand larceny conviction, and a conviction for driving while 
intoxicated.67 Defendant's seventh felony was for writing a "no 
account" check for $100.68 The Ninth Circuit outlined the 
pertinent factors considered by the Supreme Court in Rummel 
. and Solem. 69 Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court 
emphasized the fact that Texas' recidivist statute at issue in 
Rummel compelled separate convictions and sentences for each 
felony, and allowed the prosecution to retain discretion to not 
the narrowest grounds upon which a decision could be based. Id. Seven Justices 
formed the plurality opinion by affirming the use of the proportionality test with 
Justice Kennedy'S opinion forming the rule of Harmelin. Id. The Supreme Court in 
Harmelin upheld a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 
possession of more than 650 grams cocaine, even though the offense constituted the 
defendant's first felony. Id. 
60 445 U.S. 263 (1990). 
61 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
62 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 754. The "Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather it forbids only extreme sentences 
that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Id. (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 
1001). 
63 Rummel, 445 U.S. 263. 
64 Id. at 265; Andrade 270 F.3d at 754 - 55. 
65 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 266; Andrade, 270 F.3d at 755. 
66 Solem, 463 U.S. at 277. 
67 Id. at 280. 
66 Id. at 281. 
69 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 755. 
7
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invoke the recidivist statute70 in addition to the liberal nature 
of the Texas' parole policy, under which Rummel would have 
been eligible for parole in as few as twelve years.71 In Solem, 
the Supreme Court set forth three specific objective guidelines 
to determine gross proportionality under the Eighth 
Amendment: "(1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness 
of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in 
the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for 
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."72 The 
Supreme Court distinguished the life sentences in Rummel and 
Solem by noting the more liberal parole policy at issue in 
Rummel and the lack of any possibility of parole for the 
defendant in Solem to invalidate Solem's sentence.73 
The Ninth Circuit next examined Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence in Harmelin. 74 The concurring opinion in that 
case, which relied heavily on Rummel and Solem,75 held that 
the Eighth Amendment gross proportionality analysis could, 
but did not, prohibit Harmelin's non-capital sentence.76 The 
Ninth Circuit agreed with Justice Kennedy's conclusion that 
the second and third considerations of Solem, respectively, the 
intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional factors, need not be 
addressed by courts unless an examination of the fIrst factor 
leads to an "inference of gross proportionality."77 
70 See id. 
71 See id. Texas' parole policy allowed Rummel to be eligible for parole in twelve 
years. Rummel, 445 U.S at 280 . 81. 
72 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 756. 
73 Id; Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. 
74 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 757. 
76 Id. Justice Kennedy's concurrence recognized several common principles from 
Rummel and Solem that helped illuminate the proportionality analysis, including: 
(1) . .. substantial deference to legislative determinations of appropriate 
punishments, (2) the Eighth Amendment does not require that legislatures adopt 
any particular penological theory, . .. (3) divergences in theories of sentencing 
and length of prison terms ... , (4) proportionality reviews should be informed by 
objective factors and (5) the Eighth Amendment does not require strict 
proportionality between crime and sentence but rather, it forbids only extreme 
sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. 
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2. Application of United States Supreme Court Law 
In reviewing the facts of the Andrade case, the Ninth 
Circuit applied Justice Kennedy's gross proportionality test78 
and found that an inference of gross disproportionality arose 
when comparing the harshness of the punishment to the 
relative lack of gravity of the crime.79 
a. Comparison of Punishment and Crime 
~. Harshness of the Penalty 
The trial court sentenced Andrade to two consecutive 
twenty-five years to life sentences.80 The Ninth Circuit noted 
that the Three Strikes Law eliminates judicial discretion and 
requires the trial judge to impose consecutive rather than 
concurrent sentences.81 Additionally, the court noted that, 
unlike sentences imposed under other California laws, good 
behavior or working credit would not minimize Andrade's 
sentence.82 The Ninth Circuit likened Andrade's sentences to 
those in Solem and Harmelin and distinguished Andrade's 
sentence from the sentence in Rummel.83 The court 
distinguished the sentence imposed in Rummel primarily based 
on the fact that Rummel's first and second felonies were 
adjudicated in two separate proceedings, whereas Andrade's 
first and second strike were adjudicated in a single judicial 
proceeding more than ten years prior to the current offense.84 
Andrade would not be eligible for parole until he is 87 years 
old, therefore, the court concluded it was more likely than not 
that he would spend the rest of his life in prison without ever 
becoming eligible for parole for the commission of two petty 
offenses with a prior.85 
78 Id. at 758. 
79 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 757. 
80 Id. at 758. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 759. 
84 Id. at 760. 
85 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 759. The court also noted that because Rummel was 
eligible for parole in twelve years, Andrade would serve more than four time the length 
of Rummel's sentence before he would become eligible for parole. Id. at 758. 
9
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u. Gravity of the Offense 
Before analyzing the gravity of the offense, the court 
recognized the policy rationale underlying harsher sentences 
for recidivists while emphasizing that the increased sentence is 
harsher punishment for the triggering felony.86 The Ninth 
Circuit found the facts of the present case to be most analogous 
to the facts in Solem.87 The court held that both Andrade's and 
Solem's triggering offenses were for petty theft, were non-
violent, and involved relatively small amounts of money.88 In 
contrast, Harmelin's principal offense was of a more serious 
and violent nature.89 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that defendants prosecuted for petty theft are usually charged 
with a misdemeanor rather than a felony.90 In the present 
case, had the petty theft offense been Andrade's first, the 
punishment for the conviction could not exceed six months of 
imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. 91 Instead, the prosecutor 
opted to charge Andrade's petty theft offenses as felonies 
rather than misdemeanors,92 and also, utilized prosecutorial 
discretion to count the elevated felonies as Andrade's third and 
fourth strikes.93 Essentially, the court concluded that the 
Three Strikes Law allowed Andrade's offenses to be double 
counted, by first enhancing his misdemeanor offenses to 
felonies and then enhancing them again to third and fourth 
strikes.94 The Ninth Circuit explained that in considering the 
gravity of the offense, the nature of the principal offense is an 
important factor and that recidivism alone does not create a 
presumption of constitutionality for the enhanced sentence.95 
86 Id. at 759. "A 'State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it 
punishes a first offender:" Id. (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 296.). 
87 Id. at 761. 
88 Id. at 759. 
89 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 759. The court adopted the reasoning of Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence in Harmelin, which emphasized the large quantity of drugs possessed by 
the defendant and the consequences of such possession on society. Id. 
90 Id. at 760. 
91 CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West 2002). 
92 The California Penal Code authorizes prosecutorial discretion in charging 
defendants with felonies or misdemeanors if the current offense is petty theft offense 
with a prior petty offense conviction. CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West 2002). 
93 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761. 
94 Id. at 760. 
95 Id. The Ninth Circuit cited the holding in Solem, which invalidated a life 
sentence of a seven-time non-violent recidivist, as support for this proposition. Id. 
10
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iii. Inference of Gross Disproportionality 
In finding an inference of gross disproportionality between 
the harshness of the crime and the gravity of the offense, the 
court found Andrade's case most similar to Solem's for three 
primary reasons.96 The court stated that Andrade's and 
Solem's principal offenses were non-violent, Andrade's first and 
second strike were prosecuted in a single judicial proceeding, 
more than ten years prior to the current sentencing and 
Andrade's offense were double-counted based on an odd 'quirk' 
in California law allowing the prosecutor to charge Andrade's 
petty thefts with a prior as felonies and enabling those felonies 
to count as Andrade's third and fourth strikes.97 In light of the 
court's finding that an inference of gross disproportionality 
existed, the court went on to examine the remaining factors of 
Justice Kennedy's Harmelin test. 
b. Intrajurisdictional Comparison 
The Ninth Circuit explained that an intrajurisdictional 
comparison involves examining the suspect sentence in 
comparison to sentences imposed on other criminals in the 
same jurisdiction.98 The court restated that a first offense 
petty theft conviction in California is punishable by up to six 
months imprisonment and a $1,000 fine if prosecuted as a 
misdemeanor in California.99 The same offense, if charged as a 
felony, is punishable by up to three years in prison. lOO The 
court concluded that under the California Penal Code, 
Andrade's maximum sentence would have been six years. lOl 
The court further noted that the California Penal Code 
only punishes a limited number of crimes with sentences 
harsher than Andrade's,102 while the punishments for other 
96 Id. at 761. 
97 Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the offenses were double-counted since that the 
prosecutor charged Andrade's petty theft offenses as felonies rather misdemeanors and 
in addition, the prosecutor used the elevated felony convictions as Andrade's third and 
fourth strikes. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761. 
99 Id. 
99 Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 490 (West 2002). 
I()() Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 18, 666 (West 2002). 
101 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761. 
102 Id. at 761 - 62. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (fIrst-degree murder punishable 
by death, life without parole, or 25 years to life); CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (kidnapping 
11
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serious and violent crimes are much less severe.103 The State 
attempted to persuade the court to compare Andrade's 
sentence with the sentences of other non-violent recidivists 
convicted under the Three Strikes Law.104 However, the court 
summarily rejected this argument and stated that such an 
approach would require "justifying the constitutionally-suspect 
application of a statute by pointing to other applications of the 
same statute."105 The court further commented that even if 
such an approach were adopted, Andrade's sentence was twice 
as long as other non-violent recidivists sentenced under 
California's Three Strikes Law.106 Thus, the court determined 
that Andrade's sentence was grossly disproportionate when 
compared to sentences prescribed by California law for most 
violent crimes, as well as sentences imposed upon other 
defendants sentenced under the Three Strikes Law. 107 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
intrajurisdictional comparison suggested that Andrade's 
sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crimes in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment. lOB 
c. Interjurisdictional Comparison 
The Ninth Circuit observed that many states have statutes 
that authorize more severe sentences for repeat offenders.109 
However, the court noted that Andrade's petty theft with a 
prior offense would trigger the recidivist statute in only four 
states: Rhode Island, West Virginia, Texas, and Louisiana.1 lo 
under certain circumstances punishable by life without parole); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 
218 and 219 (train wrecking or derailing punishable by life without parole or death); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12310 (unlawful explosion causing death, mayhem, or great bodily 
injury punishable by life without parole). 
103 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (second·degree 
murder generally punishable by 15 years to life); id. § 193 (voluntary manslaughter 
punishable by up to eleven years); CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (rape punishable by up to 
eight years); CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (sexual assault punishable by up to 8 years). 





109 Id. at 762 . 63. Twenty·five states have recidivist statutes comparable to 
California's Three Strikes Law. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762 (citing John Clark et ai., 
"Three Strikes and You re Out ~ A Review of State Legislation in National Institute of 
Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Research in Brief at 1 (1997). 
110 Id. at 763. 
12
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The Ninth Circuit concluded that based on the states' various 
statutory provisions, Andrade's sentence would not be as 
severe in those states as the sentence imposed under California 
law based on his two prior strikes for residential burglary.1l1 
As the single exception, the court found that if Andrade's other 
prior offenses were considered, even though these offenses were 
not used to calculate his current sentence, Louisiana law could 
impose a comparable sentence.112 Notably, even such a 
hypothetical conviction would be subject to challenge under 
Louisiana's state constitution.u3 
L. Rhode Island 
The court found that if Andrade had been sentenced in 
Rhode Island, he could not receive a similarly harsh sentence 
in Rhode Island for two reasons. First, Rhode Island law 
permits the imposition of an additional twenty-five years in 
prison for a three-time felon. u4 However, Andrade's petty theft 
offense would be insufficient to trigger the statutory provision 
since theft of goods valued under $100 is not a felony in Rhode 
Island, even if the defendant has a prior petty theft 
conviction.u5 Second, the habitual offender statute in Rhode 
Island requires two or more separate convictions to trigger the 
imposition of enhanced punishment for recidivists. 116 Thus, the 
court concluded that Andrade's criminal history would not 
trigger harsher punishment in Rhode Island because the 
principal offenses were individually valued at less than $100 
and Andrade's first and second strikes were adjudicated in a 
single proceeding. ll7 The court further noted that unlike 
California's Three Strikes Law, Rhode Island's habitual 
offender statute grants judicial discretion in setting the 
number of years that must be served before a defendant is 
eligible for parole, whereas California law requires mandatory 
minimum sentencing. us Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
III [d. at 762. 
112 [d. 
113 [d. 
114 [d. See also R.1. GEN. LAws § 12-19-21 (2001). 
115 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762. See also R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-14-20(d) (2001). 
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that sentencing under Rhode Island law would be less severe 
than under California law.119 
H. West Virginia 
The Ninth Circuit found that while Andrade's principal 
offense would trigger the West Virginia recidivist statute, 
Andrade could not receive a life sentence based on a state 
supreme court holding that life sentences for non-violent 
recidivists violate the state constitution.120 
iii. Texas 
Under Texas law, all petty theft offenses are charged as 
misdemeanors unless the defendant has two prior theft 
convictions, then the subsequent petty theft offense may be 
charged as a felony.121 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that if only 
Andrade's 1990 petty theft conviction was considered, as the 
state courts did, then Andrade's current offenses, if committed 
in Texas, could only be prosecuted as a misdemeanor with a 
maximum punishment of six months in prison and a $2,000 
flne. 122 Texas' habitual offender law is not triggered by 
misdemeanor offenses, therefore, Andrade's current offenses 
would not trigger Texas' recidivist statute.123 However, the 
court noted that if both Andrade's 1982 and 1990 misdemeanor 
petty theft convictions were counted, then Andrade's offenses 
would be "state jail felonies"124 with a maximum penalty of 
forty years imprisonment125 if the court sentenced him to two 
consecutive terms. Furthermore, the court recognized the 
liberal nature of Texas' parole policy and found that Andrade 
could be eligible for parole in ten years or less.126 In any case, 
119 Id. 
120 Id. See State v. Deal, 178 W.Va. 142 (1987). 
121 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.03(e)(4)(D) and 12.42 
(Vernon 2001). 
122 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764. 
123 Id. 
124 Id; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(4)(D) (Vernon 2001). 
125 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764. 
126 Id. Good·time credit may apply to Andrade's sentence, thus, making him eligible 
for parole in a shorter amount of time. Id. 
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Andrade's sentence would be far less under Texas' recidivist 
statute. 127 
iv. Louisiana 
Louisiana law, at the time the California courts considered 
Andrade's appeal, 128 would have permitted a sentence 
comparable to 50 years to life.129 This sentence could have 
been possible only if, in addition to the convictions considered 
by the California courts in sentencing Andrade, his 1982 petty 
theft conviction and his two federal felonies for marijuana 
transportation were considered during sentencing.130 Under 
Louisiana's recidivist statute, a fourth or subsequent felony 
conviction is punished with a minimum of twenty years in 
prison without the possibility of parole. 131 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed Andrade's criminal history 
under Louisiana law.132 The court found that Louisiana law 
would treat Andrade's three counts of burglary as a single prior 
felony133 and count his federal marijuana convictions as his 
second and third strikes. 134 The Ninth Circuit concluded that 
Andrade could receive two twenty year terms, or forty years if 
sentenced consecutively,135 However, the Ninth Circuit noted 
that in Louisiana, unlike California, a sentence similar to the 
,127 Id. 
128 Id. In 2001, Louisiana amended it's recidivist statute requiring, inter alia, that 
to count as a third or fourth strike the triggering offense be "a crime of violence, a sex 
offense, or ... a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law 
punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more or any other crimes punishable by 
imprisonment for twelve years or more." 2001 La. Sess. Law. Servo 403 (West). 
Andrade's two counts of petty theft with priors are punishable each by a maximum of 
two years in prison. Thus, his current convictions could only count as second strikes 
and carry a maximum punishment of eight years, or twice the maximum sentence for 
each petty with a prior. Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 765; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(I)(c)(i), (G) (West 2002). 
132 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764. 
133 Id. at 765. Louisiana consistently interpreted the recidivist statute as having a 
'sequential requirement.' See State v. Corry, 601 So.2d 142, 147 (La. Ct. App. 1992) 
(applying the sequential requirement to three counts of burglary entered on the same 
day). 
134 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (A)(l) (West 2002). 
135 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765. The court noted that Andrade could receive a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole if either of his federal marijuana felonies 
were punishable under the Louisiana Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law 
by more than five years. Id; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (A)(l)(c)(iii) (West 20(2). 
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one imposed upon Andrade would be subject to the possibility 
of a successful constitutional challenge under the Louisiana 
state constitution.136 
The court reasoned that the possibility that Andrade could 
receive a comparable sentence in only one other state, and even 
then only if convictions not considered in the California 
sentencing were considered, was not enough to overcome the 
conclusion that Andrade's sentence was grossly disproportional 
under the Eighth Amendment.137 Accordingly, the court held 
Andrade's sentence violated the Eighth Amendment since it 
met the Harmelin guidelines: (1) gross disproportionality when 
compared to his current convictions and his criminal history; 
(2) a sentence harsher than the punishment prescribed for 
most violent crimes in California and other sentences imposed 
under the Three Strikes Law; and (3) only one other state 
would have imposed a similarly harsh sentence.13S 
3. Decision of the California Court of Appeal 
The Ninth Circuit stated relief may only be granted if the 
state court's decision is "contrary to, or involves an 
unreasonable application of Federal law."139 The court held 
that Eighth Amendment case law, as applied to non-violent 
recidivists, was well-settled at the time of the California Court 
of Appeal's decision in 1997.140 Specifically, the court found 
Harmelin controlling, while Rummel and Solem were 
instructive as to Harmelin's application,141 The California 
Court of Appeal had relied on Rummel, and had questioned the 
validity of Solem in light of Harmelin, in deciding to uphold 
Andrade's sentence.142 The Ninth Circuit held that the state 
136 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765. A Louisiana court found a life sentence under the 
recidivist statute excessive for a defendant convicted of "misappropriating or taking 
over $500" when his prior crimes included two counts of theft (one under and one over 
$100), several counts of issuing worthless checks, check forgery and simple robbery. 
Id.; State v. Hayes, 739 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
137 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765. 
138 Id. at 765 - 66. 
139 Id. at 766. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Ninth 
circuit's "mere disagreement" with the state court would not be enough to grant relief. 
Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2002). 
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court's analysis, which ignored the holding in Solem, was an 
unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court 
precedent since only two justices in Harmelin agreed to 
overrule Solem. 143 While the circumstances surrounding 
Andrade's sentence are comparable to the sentences in both 
Rummel and Solem, the Ninth Circuit found Andrade's 
sentence most analogous to Solem. 144 Accordingly, because the 
state court did not address the importance of Solem's impact on 
the present case, the California Court of Appeal's decision 
constituted clear error and was an unreasonable application of 
federallaw.145 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit did not invalidate California's Three 
Strikes Law, but instead limited their holding to the unique 
facts of Andrade's case.146 Since Andrade's sentence was 
grossly disproportionate to his offenses, and the California 
Court of Appeal rendered a decision that involved an 
unreasonable application of federal law, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case 
for the district court to re-sentence Andrade within sixty days 
or issue the writ of habeas corpus if it failed to do so.147 
E. JUSTICE SNEED'S CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT 
Justice Sneed concurred with the majority's holding that 
Andrade's motion for extension of time served as the functional 
equivalent of a notice of appeal.148 However, the heart of 
Justice Sneed's dissent focused on his disagreement with the 
majority's conclusion that Andrade's sentence was invalid 
under the Eighth Amendment.149 Justice Sneed emphasized 
how infrequently sentences have historically been invalidated 
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clause150 and stated that Ninth Circuit precedent supported 
invalidating a defendant's sentence under the Eighth 
Amendment only if the sentence exceeded statutory limits.151 
Justice Sneed found that an analysis under Harmelin 
required an affirmation of Andrade's sentence based on the 
principles underlying that decision as enunciated by Justice 
Kennedy. 152 Justice Sneed emphasized Justice Kennedy's first 
and second principles, respectively, substantial deference to the 
legislature and the Eight Amendment's lack of a requirement 
to adopt a specllic penalogical theory. 153 Based on these 
principles, Justice Sneed believed the court should grant great 
deference to the voting public who, by a majority of over 
seventy-one percent, approved California's Three Strikes Law, 
as well as to the state legislature, which created the sentences 
under the Three Strikes Law.154 Furthermore, based on the 
idea that states have varying theories of sentencing,155 Justice 
Kennedy's third principle, Justice Sneed declared that each 
state is entitled to it's own theories of sentencing. 156 The fourth 
principle requires maximum use of objective factors, which may 
include distinguishing between capital sentences and sentences 
for terms of years.157 
Justice Sneed distinguished Andrade's sentence from other 
constitutionally suspect sentences since it provides for a terms 
of years as opposed to death.158 Justice Sneed argued that the 
Harmelin court concluded that a rational basis existed for 
Harmelin's sentence based on these four principles,159 
Accordingly, Justice Sneed concluded that an equally rational 
basis existed to uphold Andrade's sentence based on the 
purpose of recidivist statutes, namely to inflict harsher 
160 Id. at 767 - 68. 
151 Id. at 768. 
152 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 768. The four principles are: "(1) ... substantial deference 
to legislative determinations of appropriate punishments, (2) the Eighth Amendment 
does not require that legislatures adopt any particular penological theory, . .. (3) 
divergences in theories of sentencing and length of prison terms ... , (4) proportionality 





156 Id. at 769. 
157 Andrade, 270 F.3d. at 770. 
158 Id. at 769. 
159 Id. 
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punishments on repeat offenders.160 Justice Sneed complained 
that the majority ignored Harmelin's underlying principles and 
emphasized that an Eighth Amendment analysis of a sentence 
imposed on non-violent recidivist should be guided by deference 
to the state's electorate and the discretion of the fIfty states.161 
Justice Sneed also commented that application of Justice 
Kennedy's principles, rather than his three-part test, will not 
lead to excessive judicial discretion.162 Upon examining the 
facts of Andrade's case, Justice Sneed determined that two 
terms of twenty-five years to life, given Andrade's entire 
criminal history, created a rational basis upon which to justify 
Andrade's sentence.163 Therefore, he concluded that Andrade's 
sentence was not grossly disproportionate, and thus was 
neither clearly erroneous nor an unreasonable application of 
clearly established United States Supreme Court law.164 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION 
When a defendant seeks relief from a state court decision 
using a habeas corpus petition, the United States Court of 
Appeals may only grant relief if the state court decision was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established United States Supreme Court law. 165 The Court of 
Appeals will fInd an unreasonable application within the 
meaning of the habeas statute only if the state court clearly 
erred. 166 Harmelin declared, and Andrade affIrmed, that a 
challenge to a state court sentence brought under the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment requires 
an analysis of gross proportionality between the sentence and 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 770. 
162 Id. Justice Sneed cited two Circuit Court of Appeals' cases as support for his 
position; Bocian v. Godinez (7th Cir. 1996) 101 F.3d 465,472 (court upheld defendant's 
sentence and concluded sentence as consistent with federal law); McGruder v. Puckett 
(5th Cir. 1992) 954 F.2d 313 (court upheld defendant's life sentence without the 
possibility of parole where the triggering offense was auto burglary). Andrade, 270 
F.3d at 770. 
163 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 772. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 753; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 
(2002); Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1149. 
166 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 753; Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1153 - 54. 
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the crime.167 A gross proportionality analysis must compare 
the harshness of the punishment to the gravity of the 
offense. 168 If an inference of gross disproportionality is found, 
then the reviewing court must engage in both an 
intrajurisditional analysis, comparing the sentence to other 
punishments imposed in the same jurisdiction as the 
sentencing court, and an interjurisdictional analysis, 
comparing it to sentences imposed in other jurisdictions.169 
The Andrade court's narrow decision is limited to the 
specific circumstances of Andrade's case and holds that a 
sentence of fifty years to life under California's Three Strikes 
Law, based on a triggering offense for petty theft of goods and 
services valued at $153.54 with two priors was so grossly 
proportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition· against cruel and unusual punishment. 170 
However, the Ninth Circuit sent a clear message to California's 
sentencing courts that excessive punishment of a non-violent 
recidivist sentenced under the Three Strikes Law is not 
immune from reversal. Nonetheless, several California courts 
of appeal have chosen not to follow the holding in Andrade 
claiming that either the Ninth circuit erred in it's reasoning 
and analysis l7l or the state is not bound by lower federal court 
decisions,172 while other California courts of appeal 
distinguished Andrade based on the facts.173 While some 
California courts have questioned the validity of the Andrade 
court's analysis, its implication on the future application of the 
Three Strikes Law to non-violent recidivists is still pending in 
167 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001; Andrade, 270 F.3d 743. 
166 Andrade, 270 F.3d 757. 
169 Andrade, 270 F.3d 761; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. 
170 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 766. 
171 People v. Rogers, No. D034303, 2002 WL 27609, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 09, 
2002) (Disagreed with the Andrade court's interpretation of the federal law and upheld 
defendant's sentence of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole for firearm 
possession by a felon plus one year each for two prison priors, in addition to previous 
convictions for burglary and robbery, two prior serious felonies within the meaning of 
the Three Strikes Law). (CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 211, 459, 667.5 subd. (b), 667 subd. (b)-
(i).); People v. Harris, No. B147736, 2001 WL 1558761, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 07, 2001) 
(affirmed defendant's sentence of 25 years to life for petty theft with a prior). 
172 People v. Camarena, No. D036775, 2001 WL 1663234 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 
2001) (court found Andrade factually apposite and not binding). 
173 People v. Moore, No. F037872, 2002 WL 57418 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2002); 
People v. Archie, No. B145323, 2001 WL 1649290 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2001); People 
v. Mendoza, No. C033884, 2001 WL 1470377 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2001). 
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light of the United States Supreme Court's decision to grant 
the State's writ of certiorari,174 
Renee R. Ross* 
174 Andrade v. Attorney General, 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001), Cert. granted, 
Lockyer v. Andrade, No. 01·1127, 2002 WL 204945 (U.S. Apr. 1,2002). The case is set 
for oral argument in tandem with, Ewing v. California, No. 01·6978, 2002 WL 480176 
(U.S. Apr. 1, 2002). Andrade, 2002 WL 204945. 
* J.D. candidate, 2002. I would like to thank my family and friends for their endless 
support and understanding. I am especially grateful to my two editors: Crystal and 
Aunt Shelli. Thank you! 
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